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Static instrumentation based on executable file formats





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- ▶ Working on various topics: Android, (de)obfuscation, software protection and reverse engineering
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## Executable Formats: Overview

- ▶ First layer of information when analysing a binary

- ▶ First layer of information when analysing a binary
- ▶ Provide metadata<sup>1</sup> used by the operating system to load the binary.

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<sup>1</sup>entrypoint, libraries, ...



# Executable Formats


- ▶ **OSX / iOS:** Mach-O
- ▶ **Linux:** ELF
- ▶ **Windows:** PE
- ▶ **Android:** ELF, OAT



Why modify formats ?




# Executable Formats








# Executable Formats




Perform relocations



Load shared libraries




# Executable Formats







# Executable Formats






# Executable Formats










# Executable Formats









**LIEF**: Library to Instrument Executable Formats

- ▶ One library to deal with ELF, PE, Mach-O
- ▶ Core in C++
- ▶ Bindings for different languages: Python, C<sup>2</sup>, ...
- ▶ Enable modification on these formats
- ▶ User friendly API

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<sup>2</sup>C binding is not as mature as Python and C++



Information extraction

Information adding

...



# Executable Formats

```
import lief

target = lief.parse("ELF/PE/Mach-O/OAT")

print(target.entrypoint)
```



# Executable Formats

```
import lief

target = lief.parse("ELF/PE/Mach-O/OAT")

for section in target.sections:
    print(section.virtual_address)
    process(section.content)
```



# Executable Formats

```
import lief

target = lief.parse("some.exe")

target.tls.callbacks.append(0x...)

target.write("new.exe")
```



# Executable Formats

```
import lief

target = lief.parse(...)

section = lief.ELF.Section(".text2")
section.content = [0x90] * 0x1000

target += section

target.write("new.elf")
```



# Executable Formats

Next parts introduce interesting modifications on formats:

- ▶ Hooking
- ▶ Exporting *hidden* functions
- ▶ Code injection through shared libraries





## PE Hooking



Regarding to PE files, LIEF enables to rebuild the import table **elsewhere** in the binary so that one can add new functions, new libraries or **patch the Import Address Table**.



# Example

```
.idata:0000000140002160 ;  
.idata:0000000140002160 ; Imports from api-ms-win-crt-stdio-l1-1-0.dll  
.idata:0000000140002160 ;  
.idata:0000000140002160         extrn __imp__p_commode:qword  
.idata:0000000140002160                                     ; DATA XREF: __p_commode:r  
.idata:0000000140002160                                     ; rdata:0000000140002740:o  
.idata:0000000140002168         extrn __stdio_common_vfprintf:qword  
.idata:0000000140002168                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_140001030+47:p  
.idata:0000000140002168                                     ; DATA XREF: sub_140001030+47:r  
.idata:0000000140002170         extrn __acrt_iob_func:qword  
.idata:0000000140002170                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_140001030+28:p  
.idata:0000000140002170                                     ; DATA XREF: sub_140001030+28:r  
.idata:0000000140002178 ; errno_t cdecl set_fmode(int Mode)
```

Figure – Original IAT

The following code patch the IAT entry of `__acrt_iob_func` with a trampoline to the function `0x140008000`

```
pe = lief.parse("some.exe")
pe.hook_function("__acrt_iob_func", 0x140008000)
```

```
builder = lief.PE.Builder(pe)
builder.build_imports(True).patch_imports(True)
builder.build()
builder.write("hooked.exe")
```



# Example

Export Directory RVA	0000170	Dword	00000000	
Export Directory Size	000017C	Dword	00000000	
Import Directory RVA	0000180	Dword	0000A000	.I1
Import Directory Size	0000184	Dword	00000C00	
Resource Directory RVA	0000188	Dword	00006000	.rsrc
Resource Directory Size	000018C	Dword	00001E00	

Bound Import Directory Size	00001D4	Dword	00000000	
Import Address Table Directory ...	00001D8	Dword	0000A3F4	.I1
Import Address Table Directory S...	00001DC	Dword	0000037B	
Delay Import Directory RVA	00001E0	Dword	00000000	


.htext	00000033	00008000	00000200	00002A00	00000000	00000000	0000	0000	60000020
.hdata	00000010	00009000	00000200	00002C00	00000000	00000000	0000	0000	40000040
.I1	00000C00	0000A000	00000C00	00002E00	00000000	00000000	0000	0000	E0000020



# Example


```
.rdata:0000000140002160 off_140002160 dq offset sub_14000A850 ; DATA XREF: sub_140001D48;r  
.rdata:0000000140002168 off_140002168 dq offset sub_14000A85C ; DATA XREF: sub_140001030+47;r  
.rdata:0000000140002170 off_140002170 dq offset sub_14000A868 ; DATA XREF: sub_140001030+28;r  
.rdata:0000000140002178 off_140002178 dq offset sub_14000A874 ; DATA XREF: sub_140001D18;r  
.rdata:0000000140002180 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002181 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002182 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002183 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002184 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002185 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002186 db 0  
.rdata:0000000140002187 db 0
```

Figure – Original IAT patched with trampoline functions



```
sub_14000A85C proc near
mov     rax, ds: __stdio_common_vfprintf
jmp     rax
sub_14000A85C endp
```

**Figure** – Trampoline for non-hooked function



```
sub_14000A868 proc near
mov     rax, 140008000h
jmp     rax
sub_14000A868 endp
```

**Figure** – Trampoline for hooked function

### Limitations

This method only works if accesses to the IAT are performed with *call* instructions. Especially it doesn't if there is *lea* on the original IAT





# ELF Hooking

Regarding to ELF files, hooking can be done with a patch of the plt/got.



# ELF plt/got

.text


```
...  
400637: jmp 400480 <memcmp@plt>  
...
```


.plt


```
...  
400480: jmp 201028 <memcmp@got>  
400486: push 0x2  
40048b: jmp 400450 <.plt>  
...
```

.got

```
...  
201028: 0x400486  
...
```









# ELF plt/got

```
Relocation section '.rela.plt' at offset 0x518 contains 3 entries:
  Offset          Info          Type           Sym. Value      Sym. Name + Addend
000000201018    000200000007  R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000000000 puts@GLIBC_2.2.5 + 0
000000201020    000300000007  R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000000000 printf@GLIBC_2.2.5 + 0
000000201028    000500000007  R_X86_64_JUMP_SLO 0000000000000000 memcmp@GLIBC_2.2.5 + 0
~
```

Figure – Relocations associated with plt/got



# ELF plt/got

```
import lief
elf = lief.parse("some_elf")

elf.patch_pltgot("memcmp", 0xAFFFFFFF)

elf.write("elf_modified")
```



# ELF plt/got

.text

```
...  
400637: jmp 400480 <memcmp@plt>  
...
```

.plt

```
...  
400480: jmp 201028 <memcmp@got>  
400486: push 0x2  
40048b: jmp 400450 <.plt>  
...
```

.got

```
...  
201028: XXXXXX <memcmp@hook>  
...
```


.hook


```
...  
XXXXXX: memcmp hooked  
...
```






# ELF plt/got








# ELF plt/got






# Exporting Functions

Exporting Functions








# Example

```
int main(int argc, char argv[]) {  
  
    if (COMPLICATED CONDITION) {  
        fuzz_me(argv[1]);  
    }  
  
    return 0;  
}
```





→ `fuzzing readelf -s ./target`

Symbol table '.dynsym' contains 7 entries:

Num:	Value	Size	Type	Bind	Vis	Ndx	Name
0:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	UND	
1:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTab
2:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	printf@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
3:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
4:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	__gmon_start__
5:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
6:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	__cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)

→ `fuzzing`

Figure – Original Symbol Table

```
import lief
target = lief.parse("target")

target.add_exported_function(0x63A, "to_fuzz")

target.write("target_modified")
```

```
mov    eax, [rbp+var_4]
and    eax, 2
add    eax, 1
add    eax, eax
xor    eax, [rbp+var_4]
cmp    eax, 4
jnz    short loc_4696
```

Condition

```
mov    rax, [rbp+var_10]
add    rax, 8
mov    rax, [rax]
mov    rdi, rax
call   to_fuzz
```

```
loc_4696:
mov    eax, 0
leave
```

Name	Address	Ordinal
to_fuzz	000000000000463A	
.init_proc	00000000000044F0	
.term_proc	0000000000004714	
start	0000000000004530	[main]

4

Line 1 of 4

→ fuzzing readelf -s ./target\_modified

Symbol table '.dynsym' contains 8 entries:

Num:	Value	Size	Type	Bind	Vis	Ndx	Name
0:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	UND	
1:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTab
2:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	printf@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
3:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
4:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	__gmon_start__
5:	0000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
6:	0000000000000000	0	FUNC	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	__cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
7:	000000000000463a	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	13	to_fuzz

→ fuzzing

Figure – New Symbol Table

```
typedef void(*fnc_t)(const char*);  
  
// Access with dlopen / dlsym  
void* hdl = dlopen("./target_modified", RTLD_LAZY);  
fnc_t to_fuzz = (fnc_t)dlsym(hdl, "to_fuzz");  
  
to_fuzz(TO FEED);
```

<https://lief.quarkslab.com/recon18/demo2>



Code injection through shared libraries

Different techniques exist to inject code:

- ▶ Using environment variables: `LD_PRELOAD`, `DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES`, ...
- ▶ Using operating system API: `WriteProcessMemory`, `ptrace`, ...
- ▶ Using custom kernel drivers
- ▶ Using executable formats




Depending on the scenario, methods can be suitable or not. Next part shows a method based on shared libraries and executable formats to leverage code injection.





# Linked Libraries - Loading

New library: `LIBEXAMPLE.SO`



## 1. Declare a constructor

```
__attribute__((constructor))  
void my_constructor(void) {  
    printf("Run payload\n");  
}
```

```
gcc -fPIC -shared libexample.c -o libexample.so  
gcc -fPIC -shared libexample.c -o libexample.dylib
```

## 2. Add a dependency

```
import lief
# ELF
elf = lief.parse("/usr/bin/ssh")
elf.add_library("libexample.so")
elf.write("ssh_modified")

# Mach-O
macho = lief.parse("/bin/ls")
macho.add_library("/Users/romain/libexample.dylib")
macho.write("ls_modified")

# PE: Not implemented yet
```



# Injection process

```
bash-3.2$ ls
com.apple.launchd.4GSpegudfm  com.apple.launchd.8MskoKf8RP  com.apple.launchd.E7vv3xpc77
setuptools-33.1.1.zip
bash-3.2$ /Users/romain/ls_modified
Run payload
com.apple.launchd.4GSpegudfm  com.apple.launchd.8MskoKf8RP  com.apple.launchd.E7vv3xpc77
setuptools-33.1.1.zip
bash-3.2$ otool -L /Users/romain/ls_modified
/Users/romain/ls_modified:
/usr/lib/libutil.dylib (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 1.0.0)
/usr/lib/libncurses.5.4.dylib (compatibility version 5.4.0, current version 5.4.0)
/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 1225.1.1)
/Users/romain/libexample.dylib (compatibility version 0.0.0, current version 0.0.0)
bash-3.2$
```

<https://lief.quarkslab.com/recon18/demo3>



# Injection process

```
→ lib-injection readelf -d ./ssh modified|grep NEEDED
```

```
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libexample.so]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libcrypto.so.1.1]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdl.so.2]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libz.so.1]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libldns.so.2]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libgssapi_krb5.so.2]
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so.6]
```

```
→ lib-injection ./ssh_modified
```

```
Run payload
```

```
usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMnNqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]
          [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]
          [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]
          [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]
          [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]
          [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]
          [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command]
```


<https://lief.quarkslab.com/recon18/demo3>



## Frida & LIEF: Frida injection in an Android application



Using the techniques previously described, we can use Frida on an APK having at least one native library without root privileges.



The screenshot shows an archive viewer interface. On the left, an 'Archive tree' lists folders: assets, fabric, lib (expanded), armeabi-v7a (selected), META-INF, and res. The main area displays a table of files with the following columns: Filename, Original Size, Compressed, Saving, Date, Time, Permissions, Method, OS, and Version.

Filename	Original Size	Compressed	Saving	Date	Time	Permissions	Method	OS	Version
libtmessages.28.so	5827124	2404333	58.7%	80-000-00	00:00	-rw----	defN	fat	2.4

**Figure – Original APK**



Archive tree	Filename	Original Size	Compressed	Saving	Date	Time	Permissions	Method	OS	Version
▶ assets	libtmessages.28.so	5827124	2404333	58.7%	80-000-00	00:00	-rw----	defN	fat	2.4
▶ fabric										
▼ lib										
▶ armeabi-v7a										
▶ META-INF										
▶ res										

Figure – Original APK

Archive tree	Filename	Original Size	Compressed	Saving	Date	Time	Permissions	Method	OS	Version
▶ assets	libgadget.config.so	119	92	22.7%	18-May-12	06:56	-rw----	defN	fat	2.0
▶ fabric	libgadget.so	11034392	4884387	55.7%	18-May-12	06:56	-rw----	defN	fat	2.0
▼ lib	libtmessages.28.so	6878344	2554072	62.9%	18-May-12	06:56	-rw----	defN	fat	2.0
▶ armeabi-v7a										
▶ META-INF										
▶ res										

Figure – APK embedding Frida

```
→ armeabi-v7a readelf -d ./libtmessages.28.so|grep NEEDED
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libjnigraphics.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [liblog.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libz.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libOpenSLES.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libEGL.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libGLv2.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdl.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libstdc++.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libm.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so]
```

Figure – Original native library

```
→ armeabi-v7a readelf -d ./libtmessages.28.so|grep NEEDED
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libgadget.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libjnigraphics.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [liblog.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libz.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libOpenSLES.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libEGL.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libGLSv2.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdl.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libstdc++.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libm.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so]
```

Figure – Modified native library



libgadget.config.so

```
"interaction": {  
  "type": "script",  
  "path": "/data/local/tmp/myscript.js",  
  "on_change": "reload"  
}
```

/data/local/tmp/myscript.js

```
Java.perform(function () {  
  var Log = Java.use("android.util.Log");  
  var tag = "frida-lief";  
  Log.v(tag, "I'm in the process!");  
  
  Process.enumerateModules({  
    onMatch: function (module) {  
      Log.v(tag, "Module: " + module.name);  
    },  
    onComplete: function () {}  
  });});
```

## Demo

<https://lief.quarkslab.com/recon18/demo4>



# Format modification

Such modifications on formats are not new<sup>34</sup>.

However, it's implemented in LIEF with a new approach that doesn't rely on replacing existing entries, using padding, removing entries, ...

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<sup>3</sup>Mayem Phrack #61

<sup>4</sup>[https://github.com/Tyilo/insert\\_dylib](https://github.com/Tyilo/insert_dylib)

Instead, it keeps a consistent state of the format:

- ▶ Export trie
- ▶ Symbol hash tables
- ▶ Relocations
- ▶ Symbol versions
- ▶ Rebase opcodes
- ▶ ...

LIEF 0.9 comes with new formats related to Android:

- ▶ OAT
- ▶ VDEX
- ▶ DEX
- ▶ ART

Modification of these formats is not available yet but further version will support it.



## Registration-Trick2

- ☹️ • Dm-verity is enabled, we can't change files on System partition;  
Which are in fact ELF/OAT
- 😐 • Files in dalvik-cache are also odex file; ←
- 😊 • System will load dalvik-cache if odex not exist in app dir;
- 😂 • Remove odex will NOT trigger dm-verity;
- 🙈 • NO integrity check for native code; ←

*How Samsung Secures Your Wallet & How To Break It - Black Hat 2017*

## ODEX Code Modification Attack: Overview (Generic)

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- Actual code modification
  - Use apktool to unpack; MODIFY SMALI CODE; apktool to build APK; jarsigner to sign
    - Modified APK with wrong signature (but signature is not part of the ODEX file)
- Compile DEX code to ART code
  - Dex2oat --dex-file=sa.apk --oat-file=sa.odex
    - ODEX file based on modified APK
- Prevent the Android VM from re-compiling (aka patching the CRC32)
  - ODEX file contains CRC32 of DEX files it was generated from
  - Patch CRC32 in ODEX file to match the DEX code from the original DEX files in original APK
    - Made a tool for this!!!



# What's next

Next version will also include support for Mach-O modifications:

- ▶ Add unlimited number of Load commands
- ▶ Add libraries
- ▶ Change signature
- ▶ ...



<https://lief.quarkslab.com>



<https://github.com/lief-project/LIEF>



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# Quarkslab

SECURING EVERY BIT OF YOUR DATA